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I. Introduction
In the comments section following a Huffington Post article, one commenter wrote,
“look at the picture of this guy. Do you realy [sic] need to do a background check? One look
and the answer shou;d [sic] have been ‘no, you can’t have a gun’.” [sic]1 This commenter
was referring to a photograph of Jared Lee Loughner, the twenty-two-year-old man
allegedly responsible for shooting Congresswoman Gabrielle Gifford, killing six people, and
wounding thirteen others at a political rally in Tuscon, Arizona.2 In the photograph
appearing on the Huffington Post article, a bald Loughner is smirking directly into the
camera. As one publication described, “[h]e grabs the viewer with his eyes, looking straight
ahead and not backing down or showing any sign of shame or remorse.” 3 The Huffington
Post commenter’s quote illustrates the prejudicial effect of releasing mug shot photographs
to the press.
United States courts have long recognized the prejudicial nature of submitting a
defendant’s mug shot into evidence during trial. In Barnes v. United States, the court stated,
““[t]he double-shot picture, with front and profile shots alongside each other, is so familiar

Jared Lee Loughner’s Mug Shot (PHOTO), HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2011, 5:31 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/10/jared-lee-loughner-mug-shotphoto_n_807042.html.
2 Josh Gerstein, Media wins on Loughner mugshots, loses for now on search warrants,
POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0211/Media_wins_on_Loughner_mugshots_l
oses_for_now_on_search_warrants.html.
3 Jared Lee Loughner mugshot disturbs viewers (PHOTO), GLOBALPOST (Jan. 10, 2011, 10 PM),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/america-and-the-world/110110/jared-leeloughner-mugshot-disturbs-viewers-photos.
1
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from ‘wanted’ posters in the post office, motion pictures and television, that the inference
that the person involved has a criminal record, or has at least been in trouble with the
police, is natural, perhaps automatic.”4 Some courts have guidelines that regulate the
submission of mug shot photographs into evidence. For instance, the First Circuit does not
allow prosecutors to submit photographs that imply that the defendant has a prior criminal
record and that suggest the source of the photographs.5
While these guidelines discuss the admission of mug shot photos to courtrooms
during trials, they do not discuss the impact of releasing mug shot photographs to the
media during an ongoing trial. Rather than discuss the evidentiary function of mug shot
photographs in courtroom proceedings, this comment focuses on how the release of a
defendant’s mug shot photograph to the media implicates a defendant’s privacy rights.
Currently, circuits have split over whether releasing a defendant’s mug shot
photograph to the media violates the defendant’s right of privacy. The Sixth Circuit in
Detroit Free Press v. Department of Justice held that no privacy rights are implicated when
mug shots are disclosed to the media during “ongoing criminal proceedings in which the
names of the indicted suspects have already been made public and in which the arrestees
have already made court appearances.”6 On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit in
Karantsalis v. Department of Justice held that mug shot disclosures implicate privacy
rights.7 Both Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis discussed whether the release of a

Barnes v. U.S., 365 F.2d 509, 510–11 (D.C. Cir 1966).
U.S. v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 1978).
6 Detroit Free Press v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1996).
7 Karantsalis v. Detroit Free Press, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011).
4
5
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defendant’s mug shot photo to the press violated Exemption 7(c) of the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”), 8 which prohibits the disclosure of government records that
could “reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy”9
This comment argues that the release of a defendant’s mug shot to the press violates
Exemption 7(c) of FOIA, which intended to preserve a reasonable expectation of personal
privacy. Even if the defendant has already made a courtroom appearance, the release of a
defendant’s mug shot to the press during an ongoing criminal proceeding negatively
impacts the defendant’s personal privacy long after the end of the criminal proceeding.
The long-lasting effects of the release of a mug shot constitute a violation of a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. Section two of this comment explores the legal
background of accessing documents in government possession. Specifically, this section
examines Karantsalis, Detroit Free Press, the legislative history of FOIA and Exemption 7(c),
and first amendment rights to access government information. Section three analyzes the
theoretical underpinnings of privacy as a legal right. This comment’s ultimate purpose is to
explore FOIA’s application to mug shot photographs. However, section three also discusses
Supreme Court and common law tort jurisprudence on privacy, because they are helpful in
defining privacy interests. Section four explores the impact that the release of mug shot
photographs to the press has on privacy even after the end of a criminal proceeding. In
addition, section four presents social science evidence, which shows that any public benefit
of releasing mug shots to the press is far from conclusive. Finally, section five concludes

8
9

Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 501; Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 95.
Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 501; Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96.
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this comment by discussing possible solutions to the conflict between the defendant’s right
to privacy and the public’s right to know.
II. Legal Background on Accessing Government Information
A. Introduction to FOIA
FOIA allows any member of the public to receive information from federal
government agencies.10 However, the Act does not apply to the courts, to Congress, and to
local and state government records.11 The seeds of FOIA grew from the emphasis on
government secrecy during World War II and from the activities of Senator Joseph
McCarthy.12 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed FOIA into law in 1966,13 but the law did
not go into effect until 1967.14 Before the passage of FOIA, an individual had the burden to
prove a right to access government documents.15 After the passage of FOIA, the
government had the burden to justify withholding information requested by an
individual.16

10U.S.

Department of State Information Access Guide, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 4 (Nov. 17,
2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/128321.pdf.
11 YOUR RIGHT TO FEDERAL RECORDS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT, GSA, OFFICE OF CITIZEN SERVICES AND COMMUNICATIONS FEDERAL CITIZEN
INFORMATION CENTER, 1 (NOV. 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oip/right_to_federal_records09.pdf.
12 112 CONG. REC. 67,13007 (1966), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foialeghistory/112%20Cong.%20Rec.%2013007%2
0(1966%20Source%20Book).pdf.
13 HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: THE ORIGINS AND
APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 44 (1999).
14 UNITED STATED DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: LEARN.
15 A Citizen’s Guide On Using The Freedom Of Information Act And The Privacy Act Of 1974 To
Request Government Records, H.R. REP. NO. 109–226, at 3.
16 Id. at 3.
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FOIA’s purpose was to compel federal government agencies to fully disclose
documents that members of the public requested.17 However, FOIA lists nine categories of
information, known as “exemptions,” which permit the government to withhold from the
public information that falls into these exemption categories.18 Exemption 7(c) is the
category at issue in this comment. Today, Exemption 7(c) applies to, “records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]”19 Essentially, while
FOIA creates avenues to access government information, it does not create an unqualified
public right to access this information.
B. Sixth Circuit: Detroit Free Press v. Department of Justice
In Detroit Free Press, the Detroit Free Press requested under FOIA the release of the
mug shots of eight defendants who were then indicted and awaiting trial.20 By the time the
case reached the Sixth Circuit, the defendants’ trial had commenced and the defendants had
appeared in court. The Department of Justice relied on Exemption 7(c) to reject the
newspaper’s request for the mug shots.21 FOIA Exemption 7(c) applies when the requested
information is (1) “compiled for law enforcement purposes;” (2) is “reasonably . . . expected

S. REP. NO. 89–813, at 38 (1965) (stating FOIA’s purpose to “establish a general
philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempt under the clearly
delineated statutory language and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and the
press may obtain information wrongly withheld.”)
18 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 10.
19 The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, §1802, 100 Stat.
3207 (1986) (subsequently amended).
20 Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 95.
21 Id.
17
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to constitute an invasion of personal privacy;” and (3) the request’s “intrusion into private
matters [is] deemed ‘unwarranted’ after balancing the need for protection of private
information against the benefit to be obtained by disclosure of information concerning the
workings of components of our federal government.”22
The court reasoned that while the mug shots were “compiled for law
enforcement,”23 defendants in mug shots “who were already indicted, who had already
made court appearances after their arrests, and whose names had already been made
public in connection with an ongoing criminal prosecution” could not claim a reasonable
expectation of privacy to justify withholding their mug shots.24 Specifically, the court
explained, “the need or desire to suppress the fact that an individual depicted in the mug
shot was booked on criminal charges is drastically lessened in an ongoing criminal
proceeding such as the one precipitating the dispute presently before us.”25 Moreover, the
court stated that “the personal privacy of an individual is not necessarily invaded simply
because that person suffers ridicule or embarrassment from the disclosure of information
in the possession of government agencies.”26 Finally, the court stated, “[e]ven had an
encroachment upon personal privacy been found, however, a significant public interest in
the disclosure of the mug shots of the individuals . . . could, nevertheless, justify the release
of that information to the public.”27 For example, “release of a photograph of a defendant

Id. at 96.
Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 97.
27 Id. at 97–98.
22
23
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can more clearly reveal the government’s glaring error in detaining the wrong person for
an arrest than can any reprint of only the name of an arrestee.”28
C. Eleventh Circuit: Karantsalis v. Department of Justice
In Karantsalis, the plaintiff, a free-lance journalist, requested the release of mug
shots of Luis Giro, who appeared in court to plead guilty to securities fraud.29 The Marshals
Service rejected the plaintiff’s request pursuant to Exemption 7(c).30 The court noted the
difference in protocol for releasing mug shot photos between the Eleventh Circuit and the
Sixth Circuit.31 While the court concluded that the mug shot photos were “compiled for law
enforcement purposes,” 32 it held that the mug shot release implicated a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The plaintiff argued that Giro’s expectations of privacy was
unreasonable because of his appearance in court to plead guilty, but the court rejected the
plaintiff’s claim and noted that “a booking photograph does more than suggest guilt; it
raises a unique privacy interest because it captures an embarrassing moment that is not
normally exposed to the public eye.”33 Finally, the court explained, “the public obtains no
discernable interest from viewing the booking photographs, except perhaps the negligible
value of satisfying voyeuristic curiosities.”34 The court held that FOIA Exemption 7(c)
blocked the release of Giro’s mug shot to the press.
D. Legislative History of FOIA and Exemption 7(c)

Id. at 98.
Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499, 503.
30 Id. at 499.
31 Id. at 501.
32 Id. at 502.
33 Id. at 503.
34 Id. at 504.
28
29
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1. Legislative history of FOIA
The legislative history of FOIA does not fully support the press’ right to access mug
shot photographs. A 1965 Senate report introducing FOIA recognized the need to protect
certain “important rights of privacy with respect to certain information in Government files
. . . .”35 Similarly, House Representative Robert Dole held that while a healthy democracy
cannot accommodate secrecy, the government must be “realistic” and “recognize that
certain Government information must be protected and that the right of individual privacy
must be respected.”36 Thus, although FOIA creates a presumption of openness for
government documents, it also recognizes that important privacy rights can trump this
presumption. In fact, the 1965 Senate report that introduced FOIA clarified that balancing
privacy interests with the public’s right to know is neither an easy nor impossible task and
observed that “to protect one of the interests, the other must, of necessity, either be
abrogated or substantially subordinated.”37 Accordingly, FOIA recognizes the possibility
that the interest of full disclosure may be “abrogated” for the interest of a defendant’s
privacy rights in withholding mug shot photographs from the press.
2. Legislative history of Exemption 7(c)
The legislative history of FOIA, together with the history of Exemption 7(c), weighs
against the disclosure of a defendant’s mug shot to the public. In the 1967 version of FOIA,
Exemption 7 protected “investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except

S. REP. NO. 89–813, at 38 (1965).
112 CONG. REC., supra note 12, at 74.
37 S. REP. NO. 89–813, at 38 (1965).
35
36
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to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency.”38 However, the 1967
wording of Exemption 7 was too expansive and allowed government to withhold a broad
category of information.39 Thus, in 1974, Congress amended FOIA and added six specific
categories of information to which Exemption 7 applied.40 One of those six categories,
Exemption 7(c), allowed the government to withhold “investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records
would . . . constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]”41 In 1986, Congress
amended Exemption 7(c) once again and broadened its scope of protection for personal
privacy.42 The 1986 version of Exemption 7(c) is how the current version of the exemption
reads and it withholds, “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information .
. . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy[.]”43
The difference in the language between the 1974 and 1986 version of
Exemption 7(c) illustrates the general trend of increasing the protection of personal
privacy. The 1986 amendment of Exemption 7(c), along with other FOIA amendments, was
a part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.44 The 1986 amendments were in response to

38

Id.

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE, 2004 EDITION: EXEMPTION 7,
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption7.htm.
40 The Freedom of Information Act And Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–502, 88 Stat.
1561, 1563 (1974) (subsequently amended).
41 Id.
42 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 39.
43 The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, supra note 19.
44 HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, supra note 13, at 55.
39

Lisa Chinai
Circuit Review Comment
AWR Submission
05/14/12
studies citing evidence that drug dealers used information from FOIA requests to learn
about ongoing criminal investigations and to retaliate against informants who provided
information to law enforcement.45 Senator Orrin Hatch declared, “FOIA contains an
exemption that is supposed to protect informants, but even a quick look at that [1974]
language reveals that the . . . protection is not sufficient.”46
Whereas in 1974 information receiving exemption from government disclosure
“would” have to “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” in 1986 such
information “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.” The “would disclose” language was a “dangerous standard,” because it
did not “clearly protect that information.” 47 Specifically, “[t]he FBI and other law
enforcement agencies . . . testified that the ‘would’ language in the exemption place[d]
undue strictures on agency attempts to protect against the harms specified in Exemption
7’s subparts.”48 Essentially, “would” implies a higher threshold to withhold information
than the “could reasonably be expected” standard and thus shows Congress’ attempt to
ease the government’s burden to withhold information.49

132 CONG. REC. S14033 (Sept. 27, 1986) (Statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“the language
of our amendment addresses the problem which was the concern of the original proposal,
the use of FOIA by sophisticated enterprises to learn about ongoing criminal
investigations.”); 132 CONG. REC. S14038–40 (Sept. 27, 1986) (Statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch) (listing studies showing evidence that drug dealers used information from FOIA
requests to retaliate against informants).
46 132 CONG. REC. S14038–40 (Sept. 27, 1986) (Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
47 Id.
48 132 CONG. Rec. H.9462–68 (Oct. 8, 1986) (Statement of Reps. Glenn English and Thomas
Kindness).
49 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 39.
45
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Additional evidence of the intent to increase privacy protection comes from the
contrast between Exemption 7(c)’s application solely to “investigatory” records of law
enforcement in 1974 and the exemption’s application to “records or information” of law
enforcement in 1986. Senator Hatch explained the problem with the 1974 FOIA language:
“[i]f a request would disclose an informant’s identity, but is not an investigatory record, it
must be disclosed. . . . Is this the kind of protection that our informants deserve. [sic]”50
The replacement of “investigatory” records with “records or information” effectively
expanded the scope of the exemption and guaranteed that Exemption 7 protected sensitive
law enforcement information regardless of the specific format or record through which the
agency maintained the information.51 The 1986 language change is noteworthy, because
law enforcement records often contain the name of individuals who are not targets of
investigations.52 However, names that appear in law enforcement records elicit a strong
presumption of wrongdoing.53 Thus, Congress recognized the need to protect the privacy
rights of “innocent” parties mentioned in law enforcement records.
Finally, Congressional intent to broaden the privacy protection is especially
apparent from the language in Exemption 6. This exemption withholds, “personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]”54 The “clearly” unwarranted invasion of
privacy standard is harder to satisfy than Exemption 7(c)’s “reasonably expected” invasion
132 Cong. Rec., supra note 45.
132 Cong. Rec., supra note 48.
52 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: EXEMPTION 7(C), 566,
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption7c.pdf.
53 Id. at 564.
54 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6).
50
51
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of privacy standard.55 A 1986 Congressional Record stated, “[b]ecause exemption 7(C) and
exemption 6 are nearly identical, it would be inappropriate to make any changes that
increase the difference between these two privacy standards. It is already easier to
withhold law enforcement information on privacy grounds under exemption 7(C) than it is
to withhold other information under exemption 6.”56
In sum, reading the legislative history of FOIA alongside the history of Exemption
7(c) illustrates Congress’ intent to broaden the protection of personal privacy interests.
Under Exemption 7(c), the government’s burden of proving its decision to withhold
personal information is less than that under Exemption 6. The overall spirit of FOIA
Exemption 7(c) does not support the release of mug shot photos to the press.
E. The First Amendment Right to Access Government Documents
Finally, a discussion on legal access to government information would be remiss
without noting First Amendment access rights. Both Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis
involved the press’ attempt to access information through a FOIA request. Case law reveals
that journalists cannot always rely on the First Amendment to access government
information if a government agency rejects their FOIA request. Although the First
Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . the
press . . . ,”57 the amendment does not guarantee the press an unqualified right to access
information. The Supreme Court in Zemel v. Rusk held “[t]he right to speak and publish

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 52, at 562.
132 Cong. Rec., supra note 48.
57 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
55
56
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does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”58 In Houchins v. KQED,
the Supreme Court further stated that “[t]he public’s interest in knowing about its
government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect.
The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets
Act.”59 Essentially, the media has a qualified right to access government information under
the First Amendment.
The examples above show how the First Amendment provides only a qualified right
to access government information. This qualified right complements FOIA, because FOIA
does not cover access to certain categories of government information like judicial
proceedings and documents.60 The Supreme Court has also spelled out many examples of
qualified First Amendment rights to access judicial proceedings. Courtroom access is an
example of a qualified First Amendment right. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the
Court recognized a qualified First Amendment right to attend criminal trials,61 but the
Court has yet to extend this qualified right to access civil trials.62 In addition, the Court has
also announced a qualified First Amendment right to access court documents like voir dire
transcripts.63

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978).
60 GSA, supra note 11.
61 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. VA, 448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980).
62 Christopher Dunn, Column: Rediscovering the First Amendment Right of Access (New York
Law Journal), NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 4, 2011),
http://www.nyclu.org/oped/column-rediscovering-first-amendment-right-of-access-newyork-law-journal.
63 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of CA, Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 512–13 (1984).
58
59
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Courtroom camera access is another example of a qualified First Amendment right.
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the Supreme Court held, “[i]n the first place . . .
there is no constitutional right to have [live witness] testimony recorded and broadcast.”64
The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed states to televise coverage of criminal proceedings in
their courts.65 In Chandler v. Florida, the Court approved Florida’s experiment to allow
electronic media and still photographic coverage of criminal trials.66 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has never allowed the media to bring cameras into its courtroom.67 Justice
Antonin Scalia commented, “If I really thought the American people would get educated, I’d
be all for [televised courtroom proceedings].”68 The Justice went on to explain, “[f]or every
10 people who sat through our proceedings . . . there would be 10,000 would see nothing
but a 30-second take out.”69 In other words, televising proceedings would create “a
misimpression of the Supreme Court.”70 In contrast, Justice Elena Kagan appears to
support camera access, because she believes that this access educates the public.71 These
Justices’ arguments are noteworthy, because they pick up on the themes that this comment
will discuss in the next section on why certain information should remain private. In

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978).
See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 560–61 (1981).
66 Id. at 560–61.
67Tony Mauro, Let the cameras roll: Cameras in the courtroom and the myth of Supreme
Court exceptionalism, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (November 14, 2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202532222249&Let_the_cameras_rol
l&slreturn=1.
68 Dan Rivoli, Scalia, Breyer Weigh in on Televised High Court Arguments, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TIMES (OCT. 6, 2011 9:07AM), http://m.ibtimes.com/scalia-breyer-televisedarguments-226289.html.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Tony Mauro, supra note 43.
64
65
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essence, all of the examples in this section show that the media cannot always claim a
general right to access government information under the First Amendment. Thus, the
Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis cannot successfully rely on the First Amendment to
access mug shot photographs.
III. Definition of Privacy
The decisions in Detroit Free Press and Karantsalis, as well as the language and
legislative history of FOIA leave one question unanswered: what is privacy? John B. Young
once commented, “[p]rivacy, like an elephant, is more readily recognized than described.”72
In other words, “[w]hen people claim that privacy should be protected, it is unclear
precisely what they mean.” 73 The Supreme Court’s position on privacy suggests that
it is not a singular concept. Instead, privacy is a multi-faceted concept and protects many
categories of rights.74 Part A traces the legal history of privacy rights most applicable to
mug shot disclosures. A useful analogy for understanding privacy would be the history of
blackmail and privacy tort law. Part B addresses cultural and social justifications for
privacy laws. Before tracking the legal evolution of privacy, this section first presents a
framework of privacy in order to guide the discussion on the evolution of this concept as a
legal right.
A. Development of privacy law most applicable to mug shot disclosures
HEATHER MACNEIL, WITHOUT CONSENT: THE ETHICS OF DISCLOSING PERSONAL INFORMATION IN
PUBLIC ARCHIVES 9 (1992).
73 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480 (2006).
74 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (citing an implied constitutional right to
privacy); See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding a woman’s privacy right to make
decisions on her medical care); See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that
wiretapping conversations on a public telephone booth constitutes an unreasonable
violation of privacy)
72
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Because “privacy is too complicated a concept to be boiled down to a single
essence,”75 author Daniel J. Solove argues that “privacy violations involve a variety of types
of harmful or problematic activities.”76 Specifically, people “should understand privacy as a
set of protections against a plurality of distinct but related problems.”77 In essence, society
designed privacy as a protection against problems that hinder activities that it values.78
“Identify[ing] and understand[ing] the different kinds of socially recognized privacy
violations” can help create a taxonomy for privacy that facilitates the development of
privacy law.79
Such a taxonomy outlines “four basic groups of harmful activities: (1) information
collection, (2) information processing, (3) information dissemination, and (4) invasion.”80
Each of these four groups covers specific categories that are harmful to privacy. 81 For
instance, “disclosure” is one of the seven specific harms to privacy within the “information
dissemination” group.82 This comment adopts this framework in analyzing the privacy
implications of mug shot disclosures. Specifically, this section examines “disclosure,” as
this category is most relevant to a discussion on mug shot disclosures.
“Disclosure” in the privacy context involves “the revelation of truthful information

Solove, supra note 73, at 485.
Id. at 480.
77 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 171 (2008).
78 Id. at 174.
79 Solove, supra note 73, at 483.
80 Id. at 488.
81 Id. at 490–91.
82 Id. at 523.
75
76
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about a person that impacts the way others judge her character.”83 Untruthful information
undoubtedly impacts a person’s reputation, but some individuals may inquire why the law
would protect against the disclosure of truthful information. “Disclosure” laws aim to
prevent reputational harms.84 “Disclosure” is an apt vehicle for analyzing the privacy
implications of mug shot disclosures, because mug shots reveal truthful information of a
person’s criminal record. As section three will discuss in-depth, these disclosures also elicit
reputational judgment by the public.
Privacy and reputation are “intimately bound together”:85
[y]our reputation, of course, is what other people think of you. What they
think of you is, obviously, a function of what they know about you or think
they know about you. Hence any study of reputation is also a study of the
flow of information about other people—and the power to control that flow. .
. . Many people earn and keep a reputation not because of what people know
about them so much as because of what other people do not know. For
people with skeletons in their closet, reputation depends on secrecy and
privacy.86
The historical origins of laws against disclosure reveal that the government designed these
laws to protect against reputational harms. Even though blackmail is distinguishable from
disclosure in that it “involves a threat of disclosure rather than an actual disclosure,”87 this
section examines blackmail law under a discussion of “disclosure,” because it protects

Id. at 491.
Solove, supra note 73, at 529; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUIDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL
AND SOCIAL CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 9–10 (2007).
85 Friedman, supra note 84, at 4.
86 Id.
87 Solove, supra note 73, at 541.
83
84
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against the revelation of truthful information that could lead to reputational harms.88
Blackmail occurs when an individual extorts money from another by threatening to
disclose information or rather, “skeletons in the man’s closet.”89 The following example in
a nineteenth-century context demonstrates how blackmail laws aimed to protect
reputation:
The blackmailer knows a dirty secret about someone. He knows, let us say,
that his banker, this pillar of the church, this leader of the community . . .
fathered a bastard child. The blackmailer threatens to tell the truth unless
the banker pays. . . . Threatening to punish the blackmailer was no doubt
supposed to deter him, but by the same token it protected the banker’s guilty
secret. Here, the law protects a “respectable” man who has broken the rules.
. . . There is no point trying to squeeze money out of a pauper, or out of
someone with no reputation to loose.90
In other words, blackmail laws does “not protect the innocent but curiously enough . .
. protect[s] the guilty,”91 who wished to keep their guilty information private.
Author Lawrence M. Freidman holds that blackmail laws were an “example of the
legal shield protecting reputation. . . .”92 He inquires, “[i]n a society that exalts freedom of
speech and freedom of contract and bargaining, even sharp and relentless bargaining, why
do we have laws against blackmail?”93 Freidman posits: “Did blackmail laws actually deter?
Doubtful. But the point of the laws seems reasonably clear. The blackmail laws were
supposed to protect respectable people with guilty secrets. The laws were supposed to

Friedman, supra note 84, 10; 86–97.
Id. at 97.
90 Id. at 66.
91 Id. at 10.
92 Id. at 99.
93 Id. at 84.
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keep the past safely buried.”94 Ultimately, blackmail laws function as privacy laws that
allow individuals to safeguard truthful information that has the potential to ruin their
reputations. Mug shots are an example of information that is truthful, but harmful to one’s
reputation. Mug shots represent the “past,” which most people want to keep private.
Blackmail laws protect against the disclosure of both truthful and untruthful information,
because a blackmailer cannot claim as a defense to violating a blackmail law that he or she
threatened to disclose truthful information.95 Nonetheless, blackmail laws essentially
provide one type of legal analogy for safeguarding against the disclosure of mug shots.
More notable than the promulgation of blackmail laws is Samuel Warren’s and Louis
Brandeis’ 1890 Harvard Law Review article “The Right to Privacy.”96 This article most
famously articulates the privacy category of “disclosure.” Warren and Brandeis were
inspired to write their famous law review article from the disclosure of truthful
information, namely, a non-salacious newspaper story on Warren’s daughter’s wedding
festivities.97
In trying to discover a legal foundation for privacy rights, “Brandeis and Warren
began by identifying the ‘mental pain and distress’ that resulted from the publication of
true, but intimate private facts.”98 Solove explains that the “harms Warren and Brandeis

Id. at 98.
Friedman, supra note 84, at 97.
96 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandies, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
97 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 7 (2000) (stating “Although the information wasn’t
inherently salacious, Brandeis and Warren were appalled that a domestic ceremony would
be . . . discussed by strangers.”)
98 Rosen, supra note 97, at 43; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96, at 197.
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spoke of are dignity harms. The classic example of such a harm is reputational injury.”99
Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous article during the height of yellow journalism and
the advent of the instant Kodak camera.100 Privacy needed protection, because
“[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts
of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the
prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops.’”101
Warren and Brandeis argued that the “existing law afford[ed] a principle
which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual either by the too
enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device
for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds.”102 The common law already “secure[d] to
each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”103 The right to privacy
“implie[d] the right not merely to prevent inaccurate portrayal of private life, but to
prevent its being depicted at all.”104 This conceptualization of privacy “asserted the ability
to control the conditions of our own exposure as a legal right.”105

Solove, supra note 73, at 486.
Friedman, supra note 84, at 214.
101 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96, at 197 (criticizing the press for “overstepping in
every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip [was] no longer the
resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade . . . [t]o satisfy a prurient
taste”).
102 Id. at 206.
103 Id. at 198.
104 Id. at 218.
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What remains peculiar is why Warren and Brandeis, men with good reputations,
would be concerned with threats to privacy?106 Freidman argues, “although Warren and
Brandeis did not say so (and perhaps did not even think so), no doubt some respectable
people in fact had dark and dirty secrets to hide. Even for these people, privacy—the veil of
secrecy—was . . . an aspect of the social order that had to be protected.”107 For Warren and
Brandeis, “[a]ny intrusion into the domestic circle would lead to scandal”108 and thus,
privacy was “essential to human dignity.”109
Essentially, in the context of this comment, mug shots are prime examples of
“instantaneous photographs”110 that capture a person’s “thoughts, emotions, and
sensations”111 at a particular moment in time and undoubtedly are photographs that most
individuals would prefer to keep private. The impact of Warren’s and Brandeis’ law review
article on privacy and disclosure laws today is highly evident. Tort law recognizes the
potential privacy violation resulting from the disclosure of truthful information.112 Under
the “public disclosure of private facts” tort law, the plaintiff must prove “publicity of private
facts highly offensive to a reasonable person which are not of a legitimate public
interest.”113 This tort law “enables people to sue others for disclosing true information
about them, even if the information was obtained through lawful means.”114 In addition,
the Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe embraced Warren’s and Brandeis’ article by
See Friedman, supra note 84, at 214.
Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96, at 195.
111 Id.
112 Rosen, supra note 97, at 45.
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recognizing a right to privacy based on the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matter.”115
Ultimately, Solove’s privacy framework, blackmail laws, and privacy tort law all
demonstrate ways in which laws simultaneously implicate privacy and reputational
interests. These examples provide a legal justification for why mug shot disclosures
implicate FOIA’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” because they show how the American
legal system has recognized that privacy violations stem from reputational harms caused
by truthful disclosure of information. In fact, other countries have laws that echo the
design of American blackmail laws and privacy tort law. For instance, in Argentina, the
Civil Code prohibits “publishing photos, divulging correspondence, mortifying another’s
customs or sentiments or disturbing his privacy by whatever means.”116 In Mexico, the
Federal Civil Code “allows people to sue for ‘moral damage’ if one prints photographs of an
individual that inflict ‘an injury in his sentiments, affections, or intimate life.’”117 In short,
contrary to Detroit Free Press’ contention, the personal privacy of an individual is invaded
when “that person suffers ridicule or embarrassment from the disclosure of information in
the possession of government agencies.”118 Unfortunately, American privacy tort law is not
an adequate protection for victims of mug shot disclosures, because victims must often
suffer reputational harms before they can bring a cause of action. Thus, in order to prevent

Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues Of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 971 (2003).
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116 Solove, supra note 77, at 141.
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reputational harms, the Supreme Court must hold that disclosure of mug shots violates an
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” under FOIA.
B. Why should the law keep certain truthful information private?
Whereas Part A presented a legal background on how privacy laws strive to address
reputational harms, Part B examines sociological and psychological justifications of privacy
laws. Specifically, this part discusses why the law should protect against the disclosure of
truthful information with the potential to harm one’s reputation.
Solove believes that “the value of privacy should be understood in terms of its
contribution to society.”119 Specifically, “when privacy protects the individual, it does so
because it is in society’s interest. Individual liberties should be justified in terms of their
social contributions. Privacy is not just freedom from social control but is in fact a socially
constructed form of protection.”120 However, many scholars criticize legal privacy
protections and restrictions on the disclosure of truthful information.121
One general criticism of legal privacy protections is that they “inhibit a person’s
ability to assess other people’s reputations and make accurate judgments about them.”122
For instance, Judge Richard Posner views “the central issue in privacy law as ‘whether a
person should have a right to conceal discreditable facts about himself’.”123 Particularly,
Posner explains: “ ‘when people today decry lack of privacy, what they want, I think, is . . .
more power to conceal information about themselves that others might use to their

Solove, supra note 77, at 173.
Id. at 173–74.
121 Solove, supra note 114, at 1032.
122 Id.
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disadvantage’.”124 By concealing truthful, but damaging information, people can “ ‘make
advantageous transactions in employment and marriage markets. . .’.”125 Similarly,
Richard Epstein argues that “ ‘the plea for privacy is often a plea for the right to
misrepresent one’s self to the rest of the world’.”126 However, these critiques are based on
many faulty assumptions.127
The first assumption that critics make is that “more disclosure will generally yield
more truth. In other words, more information about a person will make one’s judgment
about that person more accurate.” 128 Solove illustrates that “the disclosure of private
information can often lead to misjudgment”129 and argues that “the law can and should
influence the way people judge each other.”130 “[A] strong social value in enabling people
to make accurate assessment of others” certainly exists.131 For instance, having accurate
information is essential when individuals must trust others with their finances and
childcare.132 However, “[k]nowing certain information can distort one’s judgment of
another rather than increase its accuracy.”133

Solove, supra note 121; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 271 (1981).
Solove, supra note 121; RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 532 (1995).
126 Solove, supra note 114, at 1032–33; Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic
Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994).
127 Solove, supra note 114, at 1033.
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129 Id. at 1035.
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Solove first tackles the question of “why should the law pay special attention to
misjudgment based on private rather than public information.”134 Critics argue, “the
problem of misunderstanding is not really a privacy problem because misunderstanding
can occur with both private and public information.”135 However, Jeffrey Rosen observes
that “ ‘[p]rivacy protects us from being misidentified and judged out of context in a world of
short attention spans, a world in which information can easily be confused with
knowledge’.”136 Furthermore, “when intimate [private] information is removed from its
original context and revealed to strangers, we are vulnerable to being misjudged on the
basis of our most embarrassing, and therefore, most memorable, tastes and
preferences.”137 In sum, the critics are:
correct that misunderstanding can occur in many ways, not exclusively
through revelation of private information. Just because this is so, however,
need not tarnish Rosen’s insight. Much misunderstanding occurs because of
the disclosure of private information, and therefore, privacy is an important
way of protecting against misunderstanding. It may not be the exclusive way
to safeguard being judged out of context, but there are many reasons why the
disclosure of private information is particularly susceptible to
misunderstanding.138
Reputation provides an example of how disclosure of private information is
particularly susceptible to misunderstanding.139 Alan Westin argues that “ ‘individuals
need to control information about the self because they have conflicting roles to play in

Id. at 1036.
Id.
136 Solove, supra note 114, at 1035–36; Rosen, supra note 97, at 8.
137 Solove, supra note 114, at 1035–36.
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society and must present different selves at different times. . . .’ ”140 Thus, reputation needs
privacy protection, because
[e]veryone must cope with the fragility of reputation, on which the ability to
function in society delicately hangs. All who value their reputations care
about how others judge them. Reputation is especially important in one’s
public roles, because these roles shape one’s career, relationship with much
of society . . . The reality is that people lack much control over how they are
judged. One is constantly at the mercy of others—a precarious position to be
in. However, managing disclosures about one’s private life is an even greater
and more difficult burden, making reputation all the more vulnerable.141
In other words, privacy law that protects reputation benefits all of society. This argument
essentially expresses Solove’s general precept that privacy’s value lies in its value to
society. As Solove explains, “[s]ociety accepts that public reputations will be groomed to
some degree. . . . Society protects privacy because it wants to provide individuals with some
degree of influence over how they are judged in the public area.”142 In short, laws must
protect against the disclosure of truthful private information “not only because private
information will lead to judging out of context, but also because of the value of preserving
partial control over how people are judged and enabling some limited degree of freedom
from the harsh and often unfair judgments that everyone regularly encounters in
public.”143
Note that scholars are not impervious to problems with privacy law regulating
reputational judgment. For instance, Eugene Volokh argues, “ ‘in a free speech regime,
others’ definitions of me should primarily be molded by their own judgments, rather than
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by my using legal coercion to keep them in the dark’.”144 In other words, “[i]f people desire
to make bad judgments about others based on partial information, it is their prerogative.
What business does the law have in telling people how they should judge other people?”145
The first response to this argument draws an analogy to evidence law.146 Evidence
law can exclude relevant evidence from a trial because “it is more prejudicial than
probative.”147 Similarly, although certain information may help in assessing a person’s
character, the law must recognize that keeping such information private is necessary for a
fair judgment.148 Second, legal regulation of private information benefits not just the
individual, but also society.149 For instance, “the bright spotlight of the media can deter
capable people from seeking public office . . . It can deter all those who have engaged in
some deviant activity or who have a few eccentricities. This has the result of dedemocratizing the public sphere to a select group of individuals. . . . ”150 In sum, the law
should regulate private information, because
[m]ost people have embarrassing moments in their past. Everyone has done
things and regretted them later. . . . There is a great value in allowing
individuals the opportunity to wipe the slate clean. Society protects against
such disclosures not just to protect the individual, but to further society’s
interest in providing people with incentives and room to change and grow.151
Reputations need protection from truthful information and privacy law can provide
Solove, supra note 114, at 1047; Eugine Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information
Privacy: The troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1093 (2000).
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this protection.
Finally, a second faulty assumption by critics of privacy is that gossip has an
educational benefit in learning about human nature.152 While gossip in certain contexts has
an educational value, in other contexts, gossip solely “satisf[ies] idle curiosity.”153 For
instance, Solove asks, “What precisely is the educative value of a celebrity’s sex life, drug
use, or dating history?”154 Moreover, in terms of private figures, “the educative function of
gossip could readily be satisfied without revealing the identities of the individuals
involved.”155 Finally, many disclosures about a person’s private life are made to people
who do not need to judge that person.156 In short, disclosure of private information is often
unnecessary, rather than educationally helpful.
Ultimately, this discussion has presented reasons why the law must keep certain
truthful information private. Because private information often represents only partial
information about a person, disclosure of such information leads to character
misjudgments and in turn, reputational problems. The disclosure of private information
can disadvantage society. The law must protect private information in order to protect
society from these disadvantages. The justifications that Solove and other commentators
provide for keeping certain information private help give meaning to “reasonable
expectation of privacy” under FOIA. Next, Section IV will illustrate how mug shot
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disclosures implicate all of the problems that provide Solove and other commentators a
legal justification for protecting privacy.
IV. Social Science Analysis
Part A will present social science research that illustrates how the release of mug
shot photos violates reasonable expectations of privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(c).
Evidence will suggest that mug shots create an unfavorable impression and diminish the
public’s leniency towards the defendant in the mug shot. Specifically, three studies
demonstrate how mug shots affect public perceptions. The results of these studies support
the justifications in part two of this comment for why certain information should be
private.
A. Mug Shots Carry a Negative Connotation by Diminishing Assessments of
Leniency
First, the Millicent H. Abel et al. study found that that attractiveness and smiling
affect people’s attribution of guilt and punishment.157 The researchers showed participants
four photos depicted in a mug shot style.158 The four mug shots contained a male or a
female with either a felt smile or a neutral expression.159 The researchers told participants
a crime scenario in which the mug shot subject may have allegedly been involved.160 The
researchers designed the scenario “to induce suspicion of guilt but not certain guilt.”161

Millicent H. Abel et al., Attributions of Guilt and Punishment as Functions of Physical
Attractiveness and Smiling, in THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 145(6), 700 (2006).
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Then, participants answered four questions on the mug shot subject.162 The first question
asked the likelihood that the mug shot subject committed the crime; the second question
asked the degree to which the mug shot subject should receive the benefit of the doubt; the
third question asked the likelihood that the mug shot subject committed a crime in the
past; and the fourth question asked the likelihood that the mug shot subject will commit a
crime in the future.163 These four questions elicited the participant’s attributions of guilt on
the mug shot subject. Researchers then asked the participants how many years of
imprisonment—from zero to sixty years—that they would impose on the mug shot subject
assuming that the subject is guilty.164 This question measured participants’ leniency
towards the mug shot subject. Finally, participants rated the attractiveness of the mug shot
subjects on a sliding scale.165
Although participants assigned the same level of guilt to smiling and non-smiling
mug shot subjects,166 the study found a significant positive correlation between guilt and
leniency for the mug shot subject whom the participants rated low in physical
attractiveness and who was not smiling.167 The research ultimately summarized that “[i]f
the target is unattractive, his or her smile may lead to leniency; whereas if the target is
attractive, the target’s smile may lead to harsher punishment.”168 Therefore, “if a person is
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actually guilty and physically unattractive, he or she should smile; whereas if the person is
actually guilty and physically attractive, he or she should not smile.”169
Similarly, the Marianne LaFrance et al. study suggested that smiling affects how
people attribute guilt and determine punishment of a person.170 Researchers gave
participants mug shots of a person with varying degrees of a smile to a non-smile.171
Researchers explained to them that school officials accused the person on the mug shot of
cheating on an exam.172 Researchers asked the participants on the mug shot subject’s
likelihood of cheating in the present scenario, in the past, and in the future.173 Researchers
also asked participants the degree to which they believed that the mug shot subject should
receive a benefit of the doubt.174 Finally, researchers asked the participants the degree of
punishment the mug shot subject should receive, from no punishment to maximum
punishment.175 The study found that compared to those subjects who did not smile,
“leniency (granting the transgressor more benefit of the doubt and applying a less severe
sentence) was given more to smiling targets, even though they were not seen as more likely
to have cheated in the past, present, or future.”176 In essence, “smiling transgressors
received significantly greater benefit of the doubt and less punishment than non-smiling
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transgressors.”177
Finally, the Lain et al. study illustrated that the nature of a mug shot influences
readers’ appraisal of a news story accompanying the photo.178 Researchers gave
participants a newspaper story with “little drama and about which few subjects could be
expected to have a strong opinion.”179 Essentially, the news story was neutral. The
newspaper article contained a mug shot of a person with either a positive, negative, or
neutral facial expression.180 However, one newspaper article had no accompanying mug
shot.181 Researchers instructed participants to evaluate how the newspaper article
portrayed the story subject among fourteen qualities, such as “unethical-ethical,”
“impersonal-personal,” and “antisocial-social.”182 Results show that differences in readers’
appraisal of how the newspaper article portrayed the story subject were due primarily to
the positive or negative nature of the mug shots. 183 In other words, “mug shots have a
differential effect on the meaning newspaper readers attribute to individuals who are
subjects of accompanying news stories.”184 The study states, “results suggested that
readers who can see pictures of news story subjects are quicker to ascribe personal
characteristics to those subjects than are readers who no such pictures.”185 The study goes
on to caution:
Id. at 213.
Laurence B. Lain et al., Mug Shots And Reader Attitudes Toward People In The News, in
JOURNALISM QUARTERLY, 69(2), 299 (1992).
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Newspaper editors, if indeed they are concerned with objectivity, should be aware
of the impact of mug shots accompanying stories and exercise care in their selection.
. . . Likewise, it is caveat emptor for the consumer, the reader. As he or she strives to
be an informed citizen, the reader should do well to remember the mug shot’s
contribution . . . to the news story’s tenor and meaning for him or her.186
In sum, despite a neutral characterization of a subject in a news story, the nature of a
mug shot of the news story subject can ascribe a non-neutral (perhaps, even negative)
meaning onto a story. Ultimately, all three studies show how mug shots create a prejudicial
public impression.187 The research evidence foreshadows negative implications for
defendants whose mug shots appear in the press.
1. Implications of Social Science Research on the Release of Mug Shots
The three social science studies188 illustrate the justifications for keeping certain
information private.189 Namely, mug shot photographs can lead to misjudgment about a
defendant. Whereas the research above190 differentiates between hypothetical smiling and
non-smiling defendants, real life defendants will most likely not be smiling for their mug
shots. Posing for a mug shot is not a celebratory moment. Imagine taking a mug shot “after
being accused, taken into custody, and deprived of most liberties.”191 Clearly, a person
generally does not have time to look attractive by putting on make-up, combing his or her
hair, and wearing his or her best attire for a mug shot photo. Rather, a person may look
distressed or even hostile as he or she realizes that the camera will capture the pain and
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embarrassment of having a criminal record. As one person explained, “[m]ug shots
showcase us at our lowest point, stripped of all trappings that made us look like kings.
They reveal what we in fact are: Flawed, Possibly Drunk Human Beings in Bad Lighting.”192
In essence, mug shots capture only one moment in a defendant’s entire life span. A
photograph capturing one moment cannot accurately reveal any characteristics about a
person. Nonetheless, the research shows that people will make judgments about a
defendant in a mug shot.193
Unfortunately, the social science research implies that society will not judge real-life
subjects of mug shots with leniency, given that most defendants will not smile or look
attractive in their mug shots. These judgments are unreasonable, as they are based on
impartial information about a person. The Millicent H. Abel et al. study indicates that the
public will not have a lenient attitude towards a real-life person who looks guilty in his mug
shot.194 Furthermore, the Marianne LaFrance et al. study suggests that the public is not
likely to give a real-life defendant in a mug shot the benefit of the doubt, regardless of the
defendant’s guilt.195
One possible argument in favor of releasing mug shots is that a criminal record
documenting arrest or conviction has more of a negative stigma than releasing an
unflattering mug shot. This argument would hold that releasing a mug shot does not

Alexandra Petri, The John Edwards Rule of Mug Shots, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jun. 15,
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implicate privacy, because the public can easily access arrest and conviction records.
However, the Lain et al. study196 shows that mug shots have an impact over and above
having a criminal record of arrest and conviction in the first place. On paper, a crime may
appear minor, but a really unflattering mug shot can exacerbate perceptions about the
seriousness of the crime that a defendant committed, just as a negative mug shot can
negatively color a neutral newspaper story.197 Nobody wants to associate with a person
whom they deem has committed a serious crime. The Lain et al. research results198 show
the power of an unflattering mug shot and how people can unreasonably magnify negative
judgments of a defendant in a mug shot. Based on the justifications that Solove and other
commentators199 voice for privacy, the Lain et al. results200 contradict Detorit Free Press’
contention that a defendant in a mug shot does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy when he or she has appeared in court.201 Ultimately, a mug shot uniquely
implicates defendants’ privacy rights.
In short, social science research shows how the release of mug shots violates
defendants’ reasonable expectations of privacy. Recall that law enforcement takes mug
shots of defendants before a jury convicts defendants of guilt. Unfortunately, social science
shows that mug shot photos are not judgment-free. Most people publicize only their most
flattering pictures and hide their least desirable photographs. Mug shots are not
representative of people at their best moments. People appreciate the benefit of the doubt,
See Lain et al., supra note 185.
Id.
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but a defendant in a mug shot, who most likely does not look attractive or happy, will not
receive this benefit of the doubt. Congress amended FOIA Exemption 7(c) in 1986 to
protect the privacy rights of innocent individuals in law enforcement records or
information.202 However, studies indicate that the public will not give the subjects of mug
shots a benefit of the doubt, which is contrary to the idea behind Exemption 7(c)’s
protections. Not only do mug shots expose a moment that defendants prefer to keep
private, but also prevent them from controlling their reputations. Mug shots implicate
privacy interests, because they represent incomplete information about a person. In turn,
people use this incomplete information to make snap judgments about defendants, which,
subsequently, affect defendants’ standing in society. People will view a defendant with a
mug shot with suspicion, rather than with warm acceptance. Essentially, releasing mug
shot photos violates defendants’ reasonable expectation to privacy and ultimately violates
the spirit of FOIA Exemption 7(c).
B. Mug Shots’ Effects Last Beyond the End of a Criminal Trial
Part B will show that mug shots negatively impact defendants long after the
conclusion of a criminal trial. The research in Part A indicates that people have negative
attitudes—in the form of minimal leniency and benefit of the doubt—towards subjects of
mug shot photos. The ensuing discussion presents three social science publications that
show the great longevity and strength of those negative attitudes. These publications will
ultimately illustrate how mug shot disclosures violate FOIA Exemption 7(c).

202

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 52.

Lisa Chinai
Circuit Review Comment
AWR Submission
05/14/12
The first study, through a series of experiments, found that people have a negativity
bias,203 which the study defines as the “greater sensitivity to negative information.”204
Specifically, the study wanted to determine whether negativity bias operates at the
evaluative-categorization stage.205 The evaluative-categorization stage is when people first
process information into categories (e.g., negative, positive, or neutral) about a person or
object that they encounter.206 In the second experiment of the study, researchers
presented participants with pictures depicting positive, negative, or neutral stimuli.207
Researchers instructed participants to evaluate whether the picture they saw “showed
something they found positive, negative, or neutral.”208 The study explained, “[w]hen
people naturally evaluate objects in their environment, it is more likely that they choose
from a full range of evaluative responses, which includes positivity, negativity, and
neutrality.”209
As participants evaluated the pictures, the researchers measured the participants’
late positive potential (LPP), which measure “changes in electocortical activity that occur in
response to discrete stimuli.”210 Specifically, the LPP shows how people emotionally

Tiffany A. Ito et al., Negative Information Weighs More Heavily on the Brain: The
Negativity Bias in Evaluative Categorizations, in JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, 75(4), 896 (1998).
204 Id. at 887.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 894.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 See Id.; accord Yen NS et al., Emotional modulation of the late positive potential (LPP)
generalizes to Chinese individuals, in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY, 75(3), 319
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process information.211 The amplitude of the LPP reflects the extent to which an individual
in engaging in emotional processing.212 The researchers hypothesized that “if the negativity
bias operates at the evaluative-categorization stage, it should manifest itself as larger LPPs
to evaluatively negative pictures as compared with positive pictures.”213 The researcher’s
hypothesis was correct and results showed the “operation of a negativity bias at the
evaluative-categorization stage of information processing.”214 In other words, people are
more sensitive to negative information than to positive information when they first form an
impression of an individual by evaluating him or her. Thus, this study suggests that people
have greater sensitivity to a negative mug shot photo than to a positive photo of an
individual.
In a second study, Steven L. Neuberg found that negative information about an
individual creates a negative expectancy for that person.215 In simulated interviews,
researchers gave interviewers negative information about one applicant and no
information about another applicant.216 Researchers encouraged half of the interviewers to
form accurate impressions about the applicants (“the accuracy-goal condition”), while the
other half of the interviewers received no encouragement (“the no-goal condition”).217
Results indicate, “interviewers in the no-goal condition formed more negative impressions
Yen NS et al., Emotional modulation of the late positive potential (LPP) generalizes to
Chinese individuals, in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY, 75(3), 319 (2010).
212 See Tiffany A. Ito et al., supra note 208, at 889.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 896.
215 Steven L. Neuberg, The Goal of Forming Accurate Impressions During Social Interactions:
Attenuating the Impact of Negative Expectancies, in JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, 57(3), 378 (1989).
216 Id. at 374.
217 Id.
211

Lisa Chinai
Circuit Review Comment
AWR Submission
05/14/12
of the negative-expectancy applicants than of the no-expectancy applicants [the applicants
on whom the interviewers did not receive any information].”218 Meanwhile, negative
information about an applicant did not influence the judgments of the interviewers in the
accuracy-goal condition.219 Given that mug shots are an example of negative information in
society, this study essentially predicts that the public will characterize subjects of mug
shots from a visceral, rather than from a rational level. The public is more likely to make
the worst assumptions about an individual in a mug shot, rather than make an effort to
empathize or fully understand the individual.
Finally, a research survey reviewing studies across a wide range of psychological
phenomena gives firm support to the proposition that negative information has a stronger
impact on people than positive information.220 For instance, for the psychological
phenomenon of impression formation, the survey affirms, “[i]n general, and apart from a
few carefully crafted exceptions, negative information receives more processing and
contributes more strongly to the final impression than does positive information. Learning
something bad about a new acquaintance carries more weight than learning something
good, by and large.”221 In its review of studies on stereotype formation, the survey
conclusively summarizes, “bad reputations are easy to acquire but difficult to lose, whereas
good reputations are difficult to acquire but easy to lose.”222 The survey essentially

Id. at 378.
Id.
220 Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad is Stronger Than Good, in REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY,
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summarizes its findings through “the general principal that bad is stronger than good.”223
Thus, if an employer saw a mug shot, a negative characteristic, of an applicant, and also
learned that the applicant is a hero, a positive characteristic, then the negative
characteristic of having a mug shot will contribute more strongly to the employer’s
impression of the applicant than the positive characteristic of being a hero. Moreover, any
negative reputation that a defendant acquires from a mug shot will be difficult to abandon.
1. Implications of Social Science Research on the Release of Mug Shots
The three studies essentially indicated that negative information, in this case, mug
shot appearances, has a stronger impact than positive information on a person’s
impression of another person.224 The salient negative features of a defendant in a mug shot
can lead to long-lasting and overly negative judgments about the defendant. Thus, the
studies provide evidence for why mug shots should remain private, because they exemplify
the argument that “[k]nowing certain information can distort one’s judgment of another
rather than increase its accuracy.”225 For instance, in the Neuberg study, only the
interviewers who were encouraged by researchers to form an accurate impression of
applicants did not let negative information bias their appraisal of the applicants.226
However, in real life, individuals do not have researchers to encourage them to view a mug
shot with an open mind. Rather, studies ultimately suggest that people will react with
hasty, overly emotional, and inaccurate judgments if they view an individual’s mug shot.227
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The internet has only exacerbated the public’s uninformed judgments about mug
shots. People can easily access mug shots through the internet. When people view mug
shots on the internet, they are most likely viewing the photo of a stranger whom they have
little interest in knowing accurately. Solove paraphrases sociologist Erving Hoffman’s
theory that, “[w]hen we first meet somebody, we have little invested in that person. . . . So if
we learn about a piece of that person’s private life that seems bizarre or unpleasant, it’s
easy to just walk away. . . . With time to gain familiarity with a person, we’re better able to
process information, see the whole person, and weigh secrets in context.”228 Unfortunately,
the people who “just walk away” can be potential employers, friends, and spouses.
Three hypothetical examples illustrate just how irrational judgments on mug shots
impact the defendant, the defendant’s family, and society long after the end of a criminal
trial. These examples show some of the arguments for why certain information should
remain private. First, disclosing mug shots will negatively impact a defendant’s
rehabilitation into society and hence, privacy is necessary to “further society’s interest in
providing people with incentives and room to grow and change.”229 Assume a falsely
arrested person whose mug shots law enforcement has released to the media. Lois Wilson
is such a person and she recounted the effect of her mug shot on a sheriff department
website: “I don’t like that—that’s not who I am. People look at you differently now . . .
everybody is telling you you’re guilty.”230 The reactions that Wilson receives are not
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surprising. Education has not been completely effective in fighting stigma.231 For instance,
despite the highly public campaigns educating citizens on AIDS, many people still make
faulty assumptions on the causes of AIDS.232 Accordingly, even a disclaimer next to
Wilson’s mug shot proclaiming “This person is innocent until proven guilty” may not
effectively eradicate her association with guilt.
Second, assume that a newspaper publishes the mug shot of a person whom a jury
has given a life sentence. One possible argument holds that a person with a life sentence
already has enough privacy from society and thus, the release of this person’s mug shots
has a meaningless impact on his or her privacy rights. However, this person in jail may
have family members. Perhaps these family members have an interest in withholding the
release of a mug shot. The release of an incarcerated person’s mug shots implicates the
privacy rights of family members. Penny Wood provides an example of how the release of
her unflattering mug shot affected her family.233 In a plea bargain deal, Wood agreed to let
law enforcement publish photographs of her for a campaign to show the damages of
methamphetamine use.234 Wood detailed how her grandson feared humiliation at school
from the release of the photos.235
A defendant’s mug shot does not always accurately portray his or her family, but
Wood’s example shows how people could judge an entire family by the mug shot of just one
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family member. This inaccurate judgment is a prime reason for why scholars like Solove
justify the privacy of certain information.236 Note that the Supreme Court in National
Archives and Records Administration v. Favish held that FOIA recognized “surviving family
members’ right to personal privacy with respect to their close relative’s death-scene
images.”237 Only an illogical result would emerge if Favish’s FOIA ruling did not apply to
family members of individuals serving a life sentence. Innocent family members should not
suffer privacy right violations for the mistakes of a close relative.
Third, suppose a jury convicted a defendant of fraud and sentenced him or her to
ten years in prison. Also presume that this defendant is a “business genius.” Finally,
assume that the defendant has learned from his mistakes during his jail sentence and hopes
to become a contributing member of society after leaving jail. Despite this defendant’s
moral failings of committing fraud, he clearly has many valuable skills that he can
contribute to the workforce. However, research establishes the stigma of having a mug
shot photo by showing the strength and longevity of the public’s negative attitudes.238
Basically, “people with stigma are often shunned or not fully accepted by society.”239
Accordingly, protection from disclosure of mug shot photographs “permits room to change,
to define oneself and one’s future without become a ‘prisoner of [one’s] recorded past.’
Society has a tendency to tie people too tightly to the past and to typecast people in
particular roles. . . . Society benefits, however, when people can rehabilitate themselves and
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start new, more productive lives.”240 Unfortunately, studies suggest241 that if the
government discloses mug shots, then defendants in those mug shots will not be able to
change themselves in the public eye and will not be able to benefit society if they have
immense talents. In other words, mug shot disclosures could lead to the “dedemocratization” of society that Solove warns could result from the absence of privacy.242
In sum, social science undermines Detroit Free Press’ contention that the need to
protect privacy diminishes in an ongoing trial where the defendant has already
appeared.243 Specifically, social science supports how the release of mug shots violates a
defendant’s reasonable expectation to privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(c). Mug shots need
privacy protection, because studies indicate that not only will people make inaccurate and
negative conclusions about defendants in a mug shot, but they will also hold those
conclusions long after a criminal trial ends. While attorneys, who are experts in public
relations, guide their clients on how to behave during a trial, they are generally not present
to remind their clients to take the “perfect” mug shot photo. Thus, mug shots are the most
candid portrayal of an individual at his or her most vulnerable moment. The studies244
indicate how one negative mug shot can overshadow any “perfect” behavior during a trial.
However, the negative impression that people form from seeing just one mug shot is not
always accurate.
When law enforcement releases mug shots, the public is able to invade the
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defendant’s privacy beyond a defendant’s trial and beyond a criminal’s sentence. The
American legal system promotes the principle that criminals who served their sentence
have paid their debts to society and should no longer reimburse society.245 However, mug
shots are a permanent record of a private episode of defendants’ lives. The invasion of
privacy from disclosing mug shots perpetually affects a defendant’s rehabilitation into
society and a defendant’s innocent family members. FOIA Exemption 7(c) does not create
an unlimited access to a defendant’s criminal record. Moreover, FOIA Exemption 7(c)
clearly does not condone the privacy intrusion of family members with relatives whose
names appear in law enforcement records. However, the release of mug shots crosses the
boundary of reasonable expectation to privacy that FOIA Exemption 7(c) established. As
Solove explains, the value of privacy lies in its value to society. Because “[e]veryone must
cope with the fragility of reputation,” society values privacy protections of embarrassing
private information.246 Social science shows how damaging mug shot disclosures can be to
a defendant’s reputation.247 Talented defendants with negative reputations will
undoubtedly find difficulty in contributing to society. This difficulty from the disclosure of
mug shots translates into a disadvantage for society. Thus, mug shots need privacy
protection.
C. Mug Shot Disclosures have an Inconclusive Effect on Public Benefit
In their famous1890 Harvard Law Review article, Warren and Brandeis articulated
that a privacy law should:
G. Scott Rafshoon, Comment, Community Notification Of Sex Offenders: Issues Of
Punishment, Privacy, And Due Process, 44 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1670 (1995).
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protect those persons whose affairs the community has no legitimate
concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and
to protect all persons, whatsoever their position or station, from having
matters which they may properly prefer to keep private, made public against
their will.248
In addition to showing the perpetual negative attitudes towards subjects of mug shot
photos, social science research indicates that any public benefit derived from releasing mug
shot photographs is inconclusive, if not minimal. Two popular arguments support the
release of mug shots, but research does not adequately support these arguments.
The first argument that supports mug shot disclosure is public shaming. Law
enforcement officials believe that publicizing mug shots will create deterrence for crime.
For instance, one city considered posting DUI mug shots on Facebook. The councilman
behind the proposal explained, “If it takes shaming people to save lives, I am willing to do
it.”249 Essentially the theory behind posting mug shots is that the shame and
embarrassment from having strangers see one’s mug shot will deter the subject of the mug
shot and other individuals from committing crime.
Although posting mug shots will undoubtedly deter some criminal activity, “[b]oth
the psychological and the anthropological works indicate that the general deterrence and
expressive effects of shame measures are likely to be highly contextual and
unpredictable.”250 For instance, some individuals commit crimes from an addiction or
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compulsion, in which case, shame punishment may not be effective.251 In fact, some
psychologists assert that shame is the root of certain crimes, thus punishing an individual
with shame is counter-productive.252 In addition, some psychological research suggests
shame punishment causes anger and a drive to retaliate against the person administering
the punishment.253 Conversely, research also theorizes that “[s]hame has a way of
alienating people, inhibiting their ability to rehabilitate and reintegrate themselves into the
community.”254 For example, the stigma associated with shame punishment leaves
criminals “with no hope of becoming a productive member of society,” and may “produce
the feeling that improvement and change is hopeless.”255 Essentially, the effect of using
mug shots photographs for punishment is inconclusive.
The second argument holds that mug shots serve as public notice to people about
criminals, such as sexual offenders, who live in their neighborhoods.256 Solove concedes
that “information can be highly relevant . . . especially when a person with a history of
violent criminal conduct has contact with children.”257 Under Megan’s Law, parents “have
the right to find out the names of . . . sex offenders, their photos, their addresses. . . .”258
Mug shots may help parents identify a neighborhood sex offender more so than simply
knowing an offender’s name and address from a sex offender registration list. While
Id. at 24.
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253 Id. at 5.
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shielding children from sexual offenders is a compelling interest, this interest does not
always justify overriding privacy rights. In fact, mug shot disclosures of sexual offenders
may unnecessarily invade privacy interests.
First, studies on the effect of Megan’s Law are scanty and the few studies available
report inconclusive results. One commentator lamented, “[s]tate and federal governments
have not been proactive in commissioning studies as to the effectiveness of registration in
preventing future sex offenses. They have likewise failed to make inquiries into how these
registries affect victims. . . .”259 A 2008 study shows no effect in sexual offense recidivism in
New Jersey.260 However, “there is also not much proof that Megan’s Laws fail.”261 Thus,
mug shot disclosures do not necessarily protect the safety of children.
Second, “[w]hile many assume that sex crimes are perpetrated by strangers, such as
the mysterious neighbor who lives down the street, most sex offenses are perpetrated by
family members or people who know the victim.” 262 In fact, under one estimate, family
members or close family friends commit 92% of sexual offenses against children.263 Thus,
Megan’s Law is often useless in identifying sex offenders because most parents know the
sex offender. Moreover, Megan’s Law also lists “harmless” offenders like high school
students convicted for having sex with their underage boyfriends or girlfriends.264
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Essentially, the release of mug shots unnecessarily invades the privacy rights of neighbors
with sexual offense convictions.
Unfortunately, mug shot disclosures can have unintended effects. For instance,
“Megan’s Laws may stigmatize the very victims of sex offenses whom they are designed to
protect, many of whom are children living in the same house as the sex offender.”265
Research also shows that sex offenders loose jobs and experience difficulty adjusting into
society, which in turn, can increase the likelihood that they may return to committing
crimes.266 Inevitably, sexual offense will occur in some neighborhoods, just as any other
crime. However, the possibility of sexual offense should not always supersede laws that
protect privacy. Essentially, mug shot disclosures do not conclusively benefit the public’s
protection of children.
Instead of aiding the criminal justice system, mug shot disclosures provide
entertainment fodder to the public. Mug shots have become trendy features for
publications and websites. Jail, Cellmates, Busted, and Gotch-ya! are examples of
publications devoted exclusively to mug shots.267 These publications sell for one dollar and
provide “little editorial content outside photographs, names, and charges.”268 The Orlando
Sentinel digital news manager attested that mug shot postings created a “huge traffic” for
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the paper.269 In fact, the Sentinel mug shot webpage draws about 2.5 million views a
month.270 Clearly, not all of those 2.5 million views were from crime victims hoping to
identify crime suspects. A journalism professor explained that viewing mug shots is akin to
enjoying a horror movie.271 The professor further explained, “[t]hese [mug shots] are
pictures of monsters who actually exist, and we can look at them from the safety of
wherever we are, and they disappear when we close the book.”272 The mug shot
publications essentially provide the kind of idle gossip that Warren and Brandeis in 1890
and Solove in the twenty-first century feel is a reason for keeping truthful information
private.273 The public’s pleasure-seeking voyeuristic interests should never trump a
person’s privacy interest in withholding the release of a mug shot.
V. Conclusion
If the Supreme Court decides to review the split between the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits, the Court should side with the Karantsalis decision. First, the legislative history of
FOIA Exemption 7(c) is more aligned with the Karantsalis holding than it is with the Detroit
Free Press holding. Second, blackmail laws, Warren’s and Brandeis’ famous law review
article, and privacy tort law all point to an American legal tradition that uses privacy as a
legal right to protect reputations. Thus, Karantsalis has a more realistic view of privacy
rights than does Detroit Free Press. Social science research more heavily supports
Karantsalis’ view of privacy rights than the views of Detroit Free Press. Hence, social
Tim Padgett, Newspapers Catch Mug-Shot Mania, TIME (SEPT. 21, 2009), available at
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science firmly supports the legislative intent of FOIA Exemption 7(c). Finally, any benefit
that the public receives from the release of mug shots is trivial compared to the privacy
invasions of defendants.
Despite the strong social science support against the release of mug shots,
discussions of privacy inevitably elicit questions on the public’s right to know. Specifically,
an inquiry generally arises on how to balance legitimate public need for mug shot
disclosures and Exemption 7(c)’s protection of privacy. For instance, in Karantsalis, the
plaintiff argued that the public needed Giro’s mug shot photo because Giro’s demeanor in
the photograph could reveal whether law enforcement gave him preferential treatment.274
Note that the Supreme Court has spelled out certain categorical standards that balance the
public’s right to know and privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(c). For example, in Favish, the
court held that “[i]n the case of photographic images and other data pertaining to an
individual who died under mysterious circumstances,”275 the requester of information
protected by Exemption 7(c) must show evidence that would “warrant a belief by a
reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.”276 To
address the balance between legitimate public need for disclosure and privacy protections
under FOIA Exemption 7(c), the Supreme Court could extend the Favish standard
specifically to mug shot photographs if it decides to review the split between the Eleventh
and the Sixth Circuits. In general, the law should presume that mug shot disclosures violate
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a person’s reasonable expectation to privacy, unless the requester of the mug shot photos
puts forth evidence satisfying the Favish standard.
In sum, social science shows that “disclosures of information about a person will not
enhance our ability to judge . . . in fact, it may distort our assessments.”277 This distortion
starkly contrasts with FOIA’s overall goal to create an openness, honesty, and transparency.
Moreover, reputation distortion certainly runs afoul against Exemption 7(c)’s goal to
protect individuals whose information appears in law enforcement records. Mug shot
disclosures are not merely embarrassing; they detrimentally impact a whole range of
sociological factors that last beyond a criminal trial. Essentially, mug shot disclosures
unreasonably invade the privacy rights of the individual in a mug shot, with little to no
corresponding advantages for society.
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